An Examination of Whether Incarcerated Juveniles are Entitled by the Constitution to Rehabilitative Treatment by Roth, Andrew D.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 84 Issue 2 
1985 
An Examination of Whether Incarcerated Juveniles are Entitled by 
the Constitution to Rehabilitative Treatment 
Andrew D. Roth 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and 
Corrections Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew D. Roth, An Examination of Whether Incarcerated Juveniles are Entitled by the Constitution to 
Rehabilitative Treatment, 84 MICH. L. REV. 286 (1985). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol84/iss2/4 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTES 
An Examination of Whether Incarcerated Juveniles Are 
Entitled by the Constitution to Rehabilitative Treatment 
What are the constitutional rights of persons who have been de-
prived of their liberty through civil commitment?1 This vexing ques-
tion has involved the federal courts in much litigation over the past 
two decades. At the center of the debate is the asserted right of civilly 
committed persons to receive rehabilitative treatment. Beginning in 
1966 with the landmark case of Rouse v. Cameron, 2 this "right to 
treatment"3 has gained a significant degree of acceptance in the lower 
federal courts.4 Buoyed by an "unusual amount" of scholarly sup-
port, 5 these courts have held that the due process clause of the four-
1. The justification for depriving a person of his or her liberty is the critical factor in distin-
guishing civil from criminal commitment. When society invokes the criminal laws to incarcerate 
certain of its members, it has determined that their conduct is "so reprehensible and injurious to 
others that they must be punished to deter them and others from crime." McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (White, J., concurring). In other contexts, however, society 
desires to pursue legitimate interests without necessarily punishing the persons who threaten 
those interests. A mentally ill person, for example, may pose enough of a danger to himself or 
society to warrant his incarceration. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1975). Yet 
the state has no interest in punishing those who are mentally incapable of conforming their 
behavior to the norms of society. To accommodate the interests of society and the individual, the 
state will invoke its civil laws to confine such persons under conditions that - at least in theory 
- are less intrusive and less stigmatizing than those that accompany criminal conviction. See 
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551-52 (White, J., concurring). 
2. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
3. The term "right to treatment" has become a term of art in the scholarly literature. See, 
e.g., Spece, Preserving the Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive Develop-
ment of Constitutional Right to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1978); Volenik, Right to 
Treatment: Case Developments in Juvenile Law, 3 Jusr. SYS. J. 292 (1978). The phrase is not 
very descriptive, however, in that "treatment" may encompass both rehabilitative programs 
aimed at alleviating the behavioral problems that necessitated confinement and more narrowly 
prescribed attempts to prevent the deterioration of the confinee's condition or to reduce the in-
trusiveness of the confinement. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317-19 (1982) 
(involuntarily confined mental patient entitled to adequate training to ensure bodily safety and a 
minimum of physical restraint); see also UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 487-88 (1980). This Note concerns itself with the 
right to treatment in the broader sense - the right of juvenile delinquents to receive minimally 
adequate training designed to alleviate the behavioral problems that led to their incarceration. 
4. Rouse itself found that involuntarily confined mental patients were entitled to treatment as 
a matter of statutory interpretation. 373 F.2d at 453-55. The first case to lay a constitutional 
foundation for the right was Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See notes 7 
& 79 infra and accompanying text. On two occasions the Supreme Court has had an opportunity 
to reach the constitutional issue, only to resolve the case on narrower grounds. See Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318 (1982); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975). 
5. Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 973 (D.P.R. 1982), ajfd., 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 
1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). See the references collected in Shephard, Challenging 
the Rehabilitative Justification for Indeterminate Sentencing in the Juvenile Justice System: The 
Right to Punishment, 21 ST. Loms U. L.J. 12, 22 n.57 (1977). 
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teenth amendment, and, perhaps, the eighth amendment, require the 
states to provide civilly committed persons with some minimum 
amount6 of rehabilitative treatment. 
While the initial right to treatment cases dealt primarily with the 
mentally ill, 7 courts soon extended the logic of these cases to the incar-
ceration of juvenile offenders. 8 Before long, several district courts, 9 as 
well as the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 10 had concluded 
that involuntarily incarcerated juveniles have a constitutional right to 
minimally adequate rehabilitative treatment. Recently, however, the 
First Circuit became the first court of appeals firmly to reject the no-
tion that the Constitution guarantees a right to treatment to incarcer-
ated juvenile offenders. 11 
This Note attempts to resolve the arguments presented in the liter-
ature and the case law and determine whether the federal Constitution 
mandates a right to treatment for involuntarily incarcerated juveniles. 
Part I examines the varied situations that have given rise to right to 
treatment claims. Part II elucidates the three principal theories on 
which right to treatment claims have been based: (1) that because the 
purpose of incarcerating juveniles is to promote their welfare, rehabili-
tation is mandated by the due process requirement that the nature of 
the commitment "bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for 
which the individual is committed";12 (2) that rehabilitation is re-
quired as the quid pro quo for the reduced procedural safeguards af-
6. The courts have been very reluctant to displace medical knowledge in deciding what and 
how much treatment is mandated. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 644 F.2d 147, 166-69 (3d Cir. 
1980), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 999 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (court not in position to monitor day-by-day changes that affect rehabilitative pro-
grams). Instead, they have merely insisted in vague terms that the required treatment be "mini-
mally adequate." Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 176 (Seitz, C.J., concurring); see also UNITED STATES 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE DISPOSmONS AND CoRRECTIONS: A CoMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF STANDARDS AND STATE PRACTICES 65-66 (1977). 
7. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. 
Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). 
8. See, e.g., Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (analogizing to 
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), in finding a constitutional right to treat-
ment for involuntarily incarcerated juveniles). 
9. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1135-36 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Pena v. New 
York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. 
Supp. 53, 70-71 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S. 322 (1977); 
Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 458-59 (N.D. Ind. 1972), ajfd., 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). 
10. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 358-60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). 
Prior to Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984) 
(discussed in text at note 11 infra), the only other court of appeals to consider this question was 
the Fifth Circuit in Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977). Without finally deciding 
the issue, the Fifth Circuit expressed strong doubt about the existence of a right to treatment. 
562 F.2d at 997-98. 
11. Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 
(1984). 
12. See notes 34-38 infra and accompanying text. 
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forded in juvenile proceedings;13 and (3) that confinement absent 
rehabilitation violates evolving standards of decency in contravention 
of the eighth amendment.14 
With respect to the constitutional theories outlined above, Part III 
concludes (1) that rehabilitation is required by the due process clause 
when the state must rely on a rehabilitative purpose to justify its con-
finement of the juvenile, but not when the state may incarcerate the 
juvenile through an exercise of its police power;15 (2) that the reduc-
tion of procedural safeguards in juvenile proceedings should not give 
rise to a substantive constitutional right to rehabilitation;16 and (3) 
that rehabilitation is required by the eighth amendment where, as in 
(1), the state must rely on a rehabilitative purpose to justify the juve-
nile's confinement. The protections offered by the eighth amendment 
are therefore found to be coextensive with those provided by the due 
process clause.17 
The Note infers from these separate conclusions that there is no 
single answer to the question of whether involuntarily incarcerated 
juveniles possess a constitutional right to rehabilitative treatment. The 
Note concludes that the existence of such a right depends ultimately 
on an evaluation of the delinquent act that led to the juvenile's 
incarceration. 
I. FACTUAL VARIATION IN RIGHT TO TREATMENT CASES 
Traditionally, society has affixed the label "juvenile delinquent" to 
those children confined as a consequence of their "misbehavior.''18 
That "misbehavior" may range from criminal acts such as "robbery, 
auto theft, or burglary" to noncriminal conduct such as "habitual tru-
ancy. "19 While common sense suggests that societal power over delin-
quent juveniles should vary according to the severity of their conduct, 
the legal definition of juvenile delinquency is broad enough to encom-
pass each of these manifestations of waywardness.20 
13. See notes 39-45 infra and accompanying text. 
14. See notes 46-51 infra and accompanying text. 
15. See notes 57-94 infra and accompanying text. 
16. See notes 95-132 infra and accompanying text. 
17. See notes 133-53 infra and accompanying text. 
18. See T. PHELPS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A CONTEMPORARY VIEW 33 (1976). 
19. Id. at 35. 
20. See id. at 35; see also R. MENNEL, THORNS & THISTLES xi (1973) (a finding of delin-
quency may be premised on a "violation of the law or ordinance by an individual below the legal 
adult age of the community," and "acts or courses of conduct deemed socially, morally, [or] 
physiologically undesirable for children," such as truancy, disobedience of parents, and con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages). 
Courts faced with right to treatment claims have failed to consider adequately that acts of 
juvenile delinquency vary greatly in degree. This Note argues that any adjudication of the rights 
of juvenile delinquents must, in the first instance, inquire into the type of "misbehavior" that 
warrants the juvenile's confinement. See notes 89-94 infra and accompanying text. 
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The lower federal court decisions asserting a right to treatment for 
juvenile offenders illustrate the variety of factual settings in which 
such claims arise. In one of the earlier decisions, juveniles who had 
been designated "PINS" - persons in need of supervision21 - were 
"temporarily"22 confined in juvenile centers. Under New York law, 
PINS included truants, runaways, and children deemed "ungovem-
able. "23 None of the children had committed acts that, if committed 
by adults, would have constituted crimes.24 Similarly, in Morgan v. 
Sproat, Mississippi law defined a delinquent child as "any child 'whose 
occupation, behavior, environment or associations are injurious to his 
welfare or the welfare of other children.' " 25 This definition was read 
to encompass the habitually disobedient, the wilfully truant, and those 
who had violated school rules.26 
By way of contrast, Nelson v. Heyne involved a group of boys ages 
twelve to eighteen confined in a medium security correctional institu-
tion.27 Of the almost 400 inmates, approximately two-thirds had com-
mitted criminal acts.28 Morales v. Turman involved a class of juveniles 
who had been adjudicated "delinquent" and involuntarily committed 
to the custody of the Texas Youth Council.29 The Council operated 
six "training" schools, three for girls and three for boys. 30 Of the 
males, sixty percent were committed for crimes of stealing, nine per-
cent for crimes of violence, nineteen percent for disobedience and im-
moral conduct, and sixteen percent for other reasons.31 For the 
females, the figures were fifteen, four, sixty-eight, and thirteen percent 
respectively.32 As these cases illustrate, juveniles may be incarcerated 
for a broad range of delinquent acts that differ markedly in their 
severity. 
21. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
22. The detention was theoretically temporary. In practice, juveniles were often confined in 
excess of 100 days. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Had the 
detention truly been temporary, the court intimated that no right to treatment would have arisen. 
349 F. Supp. at 601-02. 
23. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp, 575, 578-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
24. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
25. 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (quoting MISS. CooE ANN. § 43-21-5 (1972)). 
26. 432 F. Supp. at 1134. 
27. 355 F. Supp. 451, 453 (N.D. Ind. 1972), affd., 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 
U.S. 976 (1974). 
28. 355 F. Supp. at 453. The court did not elaborate on the severity of the criminal acts. 
29. 383 F. Supp. 53, 58 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S. 
322 (1977). 
30. 383 F. Supp. at 58. 
31. 383 F. Supp. at 59. Since these figures add up to 104%, there was obviously some slight 
error in the district court's calculations. 
32. 383 F. Supp. at 59. 
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT 
In each case discussed in Part I, the court found that the juveniles 
had a right to treatment under the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. 33 The due process argument, in tum, consists of two al-
ternative theories. The first theory, the "purpose" argument, is based 
on the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Jackson v. Indiana that due 
process requires "the nature and duration of commitment" to "bear 
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is 
committed."34 The state's authority over delinquent juveniles, it is 
urged, derives from its parens patriae 35 interest in their welfare.36 The 
purpose of confinement is therefore to aid the juvenile, which can be 
accomplished only through efforts to rehabilitate the child and "re-
establish" him or her in society.37 Thus, the right to treatment alleg-
33. Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1135-36 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Morales v. Turman, 
383 F. Supp. 53, 70-71 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S. 322 
(1977); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 458-59 (N.D. Ind. 1972), ajfd., 491 F.2d 352 (7th 
Cir.), cert denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585, 598-600 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
Two other district courts have also held that the due process clause affords involuntarily 
confined juveniles a right to rehabilitative treatment. See Pena v. New York State Div. for 
Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 206-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 
346 F. Supp. 1354, 1363-65 (D.R.I. 1972). 
34. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
35. BALLENTINE'S LA w DICTIONARY 911 (3d ed. 1969), defines the parens patriae doctrine 
as "[t]he doctrine that all orphans, dependent children, and incompetent persons, are within the 
special protection, and under the control, of the state." See also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 
265 (1984) (state's role as parens patriae is to preserve and promote the welfare of the child); cf. 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (describing the parens patriae power as the authority vested in 
the state to act "in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the 
person of the child," but noting that the precise meaning of the phrase is "murky" and its his-
toric credentials of "dubious relevance"). 
36. See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1st Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 
974 (1984); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
37. See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 71 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (cited approvingly in 
Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (S.D. Miss. 1977)), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 
1976), revd., 430 U.S. 322 (1977). 
At least one court has questioned whether the state's obligation to promote the welfare of the 
child encompasses rehabilitative treatment, arguing that mere removal of the juvenile from an 
unhealthy environment is a valid exercise of the state's parens patriae power. Santana v. Collazo, 
714 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (1st Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984); cf. Morales v. Turman, 
562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The Constitution does not specify in what manner a state 
may exercise its parens patriae power. Historically, the states merely provided custodial care for 
the incompetent or mentally ill."). This argument must fail, however, in that it ignores both the 
realities of "custodial" confinement and the Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding the 
scope of the parens patriae power. It is fallacious to contend that the state acts in the child's 
welfare when it removes him from an unsafe environment and places him in an equally harsh 
institution. See note 138 infra. Moreover, that child will eventually be returned to society, 
where he is likely to confront the same problems that led to his initial incarceration. It is difficult 
to say that society truly aids the juvenile when it temporarily removes him from an unhealthy 
environment only to return him to society ill-equipped to function as a responsible citizen. In· 
deed, after being "warehoused" in a juvenile facility for an extended period of time, it is not 
inconceivable that the juvenile will emerge even worse off than when society first interposed itself 
between him and his "unhealthy environment." See note 153 infra. It is perhaps in recognition 
of these realities that the Supreme Court has found the parens patriae authority to include the 
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edly follows from Jackson's insistence that the nature of commitment 
bear a reasonable relation to the purpose of that commitment. 38 
The second due process argument on which right to treatment 
claims have been founded is the "quid pro quo" argument.39 Accord-
ing to this theory, incarcerated juveniles have a right to treatment be-
cause they generally receive less procedural protection than adults. A 
line of Supreme Court cases40 has found it constitutionally permissible 
for a state, in juvenile proceedings, to dispense with certain procedural 
safeguards that are mandated in criminal trials of adults.41 This denial 
is justified by reference to the rehabilitative, as opposed to the puni-
tive, goals of the juvenile justice system. 42 The hope is that freeing the 
states from the strict procedural requirements of the adult criminal 
justice system will afford them greater latitude in pursuing the rehabil-
itative goals of the juvenile system. 43 Since the denial of procedural 
due process is seemingly predicated on the pursuit of rehabilitative 
goals, it is argued that the denial is constitutionally impermissible un-
less the state provides the expected rehabilitation.44 In short, due pro-
cess requires the state to offer treatment as the quid pro quo for the 
deprivation of procedural safeguards.45 
Finally, a number of courts have suggested that the eighth 
amendment46 may afford an independent basis for the right to treat-
provision of rehabilitative treatment. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1312 (1978) 
(probation officer, who exercises the authority of the state as parens patriae, has duty to imple-
ment "the protective and rehabilitative powers of the juvenile court") (quoting In re Michael C., 
21 Cal. 3d 471, 476, 579 P.2d 7, 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358, 361 (1978)) (emphasis added); Kent v. 
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966) ("There is much evidence that some juvenile courts 
•.. lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the 
state in a parens patriae capacity .•.. There is evidence, in fact, that ... the child receives .•• 
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment 
postulated for children."). 
38. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. 
39. See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 71 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revel, 535 F.2d 864 
(5th Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S. 322 (1977). 
40. See Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 458-59 (N.D. Ind. 1972), affd., 491 F.2d 352 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (describing the Supreme Court precedent in this area). 
41. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), for example, held that a state need not 
provide a juvenile offender with a trial by jury. 
42. See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 
974 (1984). 
43. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 n.5, 547 (1971) (no constitutional right 
to jury trial in juvenile proceedings so that state may be free to devote its resources and ingenuity 
to the pursuit of rehabilitative goals); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (Harlan, J., con-
curring) (procedural strictures should not be permitted to interfere with the states' purpose in 
creating juvenile courts, including the "worthy goal" of rehabilitating the juvenile). 
44. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (S.D. Miss. 1977). 
45. See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 
974 (1984); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 71 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th 
Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S. 322 (1977). 
46. By its terms, the eighth amendment proscribes "[e]xcessive bail," "excessive fines," and 
"cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII. 
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ment.47 It is fair to say, however, that none of the courts that have 
alluded to a right to treatment arising under the eighth amendment 
have made the slightest attempt to develop this theory. In Martarella 
v. Kelley, the court indiscriminately merged the fourteenth and eighth 
amendment sources of the right, concluding that "[w]here the State, as 
parens patriae, imposes such detention, it can meet the Constitution's 
requirement of due process and prohibition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment if, and only if, it furnishes adequate treatment to the de-
tainee. "48 In Morales v. Turman 49 and Morgan v. Sproat, so the courts 
merely asserted that the strictures of the eighth amendment apply to 
conditions of civil confinement.51 Apart from this bare conclusion, 
neither court even stopped to consider whether the punishment being 
inflicted upon the juveniles - incarceration without rehabilitative 
treatment - could properly be deemed "cruel and unusual." 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES EXAMINED 
The courts have differed significantly regarding the relative weight 
of the constitutional arguments discussed in Part II. In Morgan v. 
Sproat, 52 the court embraced both the purpose and the quid pro quo 
arguments, concluding that the right to treatment was supported inde-
pendently by each of these "two equally sound theories."53 The court 
in Martarel/a v. Kelley 54 was less bold; while concluding that the right 
to treatment undoubtedly existed, it hedged as to whether that right 
was based on "due process, equal protection or the Eighth Amend-
ment, or a combination of them."55 And, in rejecting the existence of 
a right to treatment, the First Circuit completely derogated the quid 
pro quo argument, concluding that it had "even less merit" than the 
purpose argument. 56 Thus, it remains unclear whether any of these 
47. Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. 
Supp. 53, 70 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), revd .. 430 U.S. 322 {1977); 
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
48. 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also Doe v. McFaul, 599 F. Supp. 1421, 1429 
(N.D. Ohio 1984) (accepting Martarel/a's conclusory statement that detention of juveniles with-
out treatment implicates both due process and cruel and unusual punishment concerns). 
49. 383 F. Supp. 53, 70 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S. 
322 (1977). 
50. 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (S.D. Miss. 1977). 
51. The Supreme Court has never had occasion to apply the eighth amendment outside the 
context of criminal punishment. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666 (1977). However, a 
persuasive argument can be made that conditions of juvenile confinement should be scrutinized 
under eighth amendment standards. See notes 134-41 infra and accompanying text. 
52. 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977). 
53. 432 F. Supp. at 1135-36. 
54. 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
55. 349 F. Supp. at 599. 
56. Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1177 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 
(1984). 
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theories, either independently or in combination, support a constitu-
tional right to treatment for involuntarily confined juveniles. 
A. The Purpose Argument 
In Jackson v. Indiana, 57 the Supreme Court established the re-
quirement that the nature of civil confinement bear a reasonable rela-
tion to its purpose.58 Jackson itself, however, involved the 
commitment of a criminal defendant who, due to mental illness, was 
deemed incompetent to stand trial. 59 The purpose of the commitment 
- to aid the defendant in attaining competency through custodial care 
and treatment - was not in dispute. 60 Due process therefore obli-
gated the state to treat the defendant, or, in the absence of treatment, 
to release him. 61 Obviously, the Court had no occasion to examine the 
purpose(s) of the juvenile justice system when it insisted in Jackson 
that states conform the nature of civil commitment to its purpose. 
However, on other occasions the Supreme Court has had ample 
opportunity to consider the objectives of the juvenile system. Indeed, a 
series of Court decisions in the juvenile justice area can be read for the 
proposition that the very existence of juvenile courts as a separate sys-
tem is justified primarily by reference to rehabilitative goals. In Kent 
v. United States, 62 for example, the Court expressly noted that the 
state's authority over juvenile delinquents proceeds from a parens pa-
triae rationale. 63 Observing that the "theoretical" purpose of juvenile 
courts is to determine the needs of children and society rather than to 
adjudicate criminal conduct, the Court expressed concern with the 
fact that, in practice, juveniles are often deprived of the "solicitous 
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."64 In subse-
quent cases involving the due process requirements of juvenile pro-
ceedings, the Court has echoed this theme. 65 
57. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
58. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. 
59. 406 U.S. at 717-19, 738. 
60. 406 U.S. at 738. 
61. 406 U.S. at 738. 
62. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
63. 383 U.S. at 554-56. 
64. 383 U.S. at 554-56. 
65. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 n.5 (1971) ("In theory the juvenile 
court was to be helpful and rehabilitative rather than punitive ...• In theory it was to exercise its 
protective powers to bring an errant child back into the fold .•.. In theory it was to concentrate 
on each case the best of current social science learning.") (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 7-9 (1967)); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967): 
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties .... They believed that 
society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was "guilty" or "innocent," but "What 
is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the 
interest of the state to save him from a downward career." ... The child was to be "treated" 
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The Court's characterization of the purpose of the juvenile justice 
system is supported by the voluminous scholarly literature on the sub-
ject. 66 One author writes: 
Traditional juvenile justice philosophy depicts the Uuvenile] court as 
non-punitive and therapeutic, a legal institution whose espoused goals 
are the protection and guidance of children . . . . [T]he prevailing inter-
pretation of the court has depicted it as an expression of humanitarian 
sentiments in which children are not truly capable of criminal intent and 
the state, embodying the principle of parens patriae, is the benevolent 
protector. 67 
While focusing on the rehabilitative mission of the juvenile justice 
system, both the Court and academia have nevertheless recognized 
that society may have other valid interests in confining juvenile delin-
quents. Foremost among those interests is the protection of society. 68 
As noted _earlier, many involuntarily confined juveniles have commit-
ted criminal acts that evidence a significant danger to society.69 
Though society may wish to eschew the full weight of criminal penal-
ties for offenses of this kind,7° it may - and in fact does - retain a 
significant interest in preventing the recurrence of such "antisocial" 
and "rehabilitated" and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, 
were to be "clinical" rather than punitive. 
(Footnote omitted). See also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 108 (1979) (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring) (emphasizing the "beneficent and rehabilitative purposes" of the states' 
juvenile court systems). 
66. See Gottfredson, Chandler & Cohen, Legal Aim, Discretion, and Social Control: A Case 
Study of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 95, 97 (1983): 
The growth of the juvenile court movement in the United States has been traced to the idea 
that, in setting the proper role for state intervention in the lives of adjudicated delinquents, 
the rehabilitative ideal should predominate. The strong preference for considering the reha· 
bilitative needs of the juvenile offender ... is reflected in statutes governing the disposition 
of juveniles, in case co=entary and decisions, and in the professional literature. 
67. M. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT 1 (1982); see also Polier, Prescriptions for 
Reform: Doing What We Set Out to Do?, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY 
AND CURRENT REFORMS 217 (L. Empey ed. 1979) (juvenile court movement founded on prem· 
ise that society would provide care, support, and rehabilitative services as needed); R. MENNEL, 
supra note 20, at xxvii (juvenile justice system designed to ensure that juvenile delinquents are 
suitably corrected and reformed); UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVE· 
NILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING: YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS: BETWEEN Two 
WORLDS 15 (1982) (ultimately, parens patriae theory became the constitutional foundation for a 
separate system of juvenile courts). 
68. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) ("We have stressed before that crime 
prevention is a 'weighty social objective,' and this interest persists undiluted in the juvenile con-
text.") (citation omitted); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 546 n.6 (1971) (While rehabilitating offenders 
is appropriately the primary way of dealing with children, the "guiding consideration for a court 
of law that deals with threatening conduct is nonetheless protection of the community.") (quot-
ing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OP JUSTICE, 
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 7-9 (1967)); T. PHELPS, 
supra note 18, at 217; UNITED STATES DEPT. OP JUSTICE, supra note 67, at 7 (society must strike 
proper balance between the "dual juvenile court goals of rehabilitating youth and protecting 
society"). 
69. See text at notes 27-32 supra. 
70. See note 1 supra; notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text. 
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behavior. 71 To vindicate this interest, a state may exercise its police 
power to incarcerate those juveniles who pose a significant danger to 
society.72 
Arguably, certain juveniles may be subjected to a deprivation of 
liberty only by an exercise of the state's parens patriae power. It is 
difficult to conceive how "habitual truants and runaways,"73 for exam-
ple, would pose a significant enough "danger" to society to justify 
their confinement under the state's police power.74 Normally, a juve-
nile's parents would be expected to eradicate such misbehavior, and 
only when they failed would the state be empowered to fill their shoes 
in its traditional role as parens patriae. 15 In these situations, the state 
must actually invoke the rehabilitative aims of the juvenile justice sys-
tem in order to deprive the juvenile of his or her liberty.76 Absent its 
interest in providing for the juvenile's welfare, the state would be pow-
erless to confine the juvenile. Because the state must rely on a rehabil-
itative purpose to support the juvenile's incarceration, the limitations 
on the nature of confinement enunciated in Jackson v. Indiana 11 apply 
with full force. 1s When a deprivation of liberty is justified on "the 
71. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
72. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also 
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263-65, 274 (1984) (need to protect society justifies preventive 
detention of juveniles likely to commit crimes if released). 
73. See text at notes 19 & 23 supra. 
74. This is not to suggest that the state may not combat truancy or noncriminal delinquency 
through the exercise of its police power. Traditionally, the police power has been employed by 
state and local governments to promote and maintain the health, morals, safety and "general 
welfare" of the public. See, e.g., East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945); 
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 411 (1935). However, the issue is not 
whether the state may exercise its police power - perhaps in the guise of the infamous "truant 
officer" - to deter truancy or other acts of domestic disobedience. Rather, the critical question 
is whether the police power supports the involuntary confinement of juveniles who have commit-
ted such relatively innocuous acts. Historically, it seems clear that confinement under the police 
power was limited to acts that posed a more serious danger to society, whereas the parens patriae 
power provided the sole justification for confining children with behavioral problems. See John-
son v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 285-87 (D. Md. 1979) ("Dangerousness to others results in 
commitment under the State's police powers, whereas dangerousness to oneself provides the ra-
tionale for commitment by the State's parens patriae powers."); note 75 infra; see also Lynch v. 
Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1458 (11th Cir. 1984) ("When it is attempting to protect society from the 
dangerous mentally ill, the state is using its police power. When it is acting as a parent to care for 
those incapable of helping themselves, the state is employing its parens patriae power.") (footnote 
omitted); cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) 
("[I]n the exercise of its police power a State may confine individuals solely to protect society 
from the dangers of significant antisocial acts or co=unicable disease.") (emphasis added). 
75. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) ("Children, by definition, are not assumed 
to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of 
their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae. ");In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17, 30 (1967) ("If ... parents default in effectively performing their custo-
dial functions ... the state may intervene."); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966) 
(exercise of parens patriae power places state in "parental" role). 
76. See notes 37 & 74 supra. 
77. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
78. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.10 (1975) ("Where 'treatment' is 
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altruistic theory" that the confinement is for "humane therapeutic rea-
sons," a failure to provide rehabilitative treatment "violates the very 
fundamentals of due process."79 
The more difficult issue is whether Jackson applies to juvenile con-
finement that may be fully justified by either the police or the parens 
patriae power. When a juvenile is confined for an act that, if he or she 
were an adult, would constitute a criminal offense, the state may jus-
tify the confinement by citing the need to protect society. 80 However, 
the fact that the juvenile is processed through a system purposely de-
marcated from the adult criminal justice system suggests that protec-
tion of society is not the sole81 purpose of confinement. Since a 
juvenile may not be capable of the same criminal intent as an adult, 82 
and since juveniles are arguably more amenable to rehabilitation, 83 
one can argue that the rehabilitative aims of the juvenile justice system 
obtain wholly apart from the seriousness of the offense. In short, soci-
ety may have an interest in rehabilitating all juvenile delinquents, irre-
spective of the nature of their delinquent acts. 
The difficulty with the above argument is that it confuses the tradi-
tional objectives of the juvenile justice system with the authority vested 
in the state to confine juveniles for acts of delinquency. By emphasiz-
ing its interest in rehabilitating juveniles, the state may well assume a 
moral obligation to provide adequate treatment. 84 A mere statement 
of interest, however, does not elevate the right to treatment to consti-
tutional dimensions. 85 Only when rehabilitation is the sole purpose 
and justification for depriving a juvenile of his or her liberty does the 
due process clause create a right to receive that rehabilitation. Where 
the deprivation of liberty is unauthorized absent a rehabilitative pur-
the sole asserted ground for depriving a person of liberty, it is plainly unacceptable to suggest 
that the courts are powerless to determine whether the asserted ground is present.") (citing Jack-
son v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)). The Court explicitly refused to consider whether mentally 
ill patients who did pose a danger to society were likewise entitled to treatment. 422 U.S. at 573. 
79. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971). 
80. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text. 
81. See note 78 supra. 
82. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551-52 (1971) (White, J., concurring) 
("Reprehensible acts by juveniles are not deemed the consequence of mature and malevolent 
choice but of environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond their con-
trol."); M. BORlNER, supra note 67; text at note 67 supra. But see note 147 infra. 
83. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265-66 n.15 (1984) ("Our society recognizes that 
juveniles in general are in the earlier stages of their emotional growth ..• and that their value 
systems have not yet been clearly identified or firmly adopted.") (quoting People v. Schupf, 39 
N.Y.2d 682, 687, 350 N.E.2d 906, 908, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518, 520 (1976)). 
84. Choosing to rehabilitate juvenile offenders may therefore be wise as a matter of social 
policy. Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Santana v. Collazo, 714 
F.2d 1172, 1177 (1st Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). 
85. Obviously, a multitude of state activities are undertaken with an avowed purpose. For 
instance, a state may construct a highway system for the purpose of facilitating automobile 
travel. No one would seriously contend that the state's acknowledged purpose in building the 
highway system elevated automobile travel to a constitutional right. 
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pose, a state acts arbitrarily, and therefore in contravention of the due 
process clause, when it denies the juvenile the very rehabilitation that 
supports the confinement. 86 However, where the deprivation is legiti-
mate even in the absence of a rehabilitative purpose, the state need not 
rely on such a purpose to deprive the juvenile of his or her liberty, and 
it is therefore not constrained by the due process clause from weighing 
the social utility of providing rehabilitative treatment. 
While the state may therefore have a general interest in rehabilitat-
ing all juvenile offenders, it nonetheless has the power to incarcerate 
certain juveniles solely in order to protect society from their antisocial 
acts.87 No one would suggest, I take it, that the lack of financial re-
sources or psychiatric knowledge to maintain successful rehabilitative 
programs would deprive the state of the power to remove dangerous 
juveniles from society. The fact that the police power may, in certain 
instances, constitute an independent and sufficient basis for confining 
delinquent juveniles undermines the assertion that all incarcerated 
juveniles, regardless of the nature of their delinquency, are entitled by 
the Constitution to rehabilitative treatment. 
This conclusion, of course, does not imply that the purpose argu-
ment is without merit. 88 Rather, it merely rejects the existence of an 
absolute right to treatment in all cases involving the confinement of 
juvenile offenders. Unfortunately, the need to draw precise factual dis-
tinctions among juvenile offenders has been ignored by those lower 
federal courts that have entertained right to treatment claims. Only 
one of these courts has intimated that its decision was influenced by 
the type of misbehavior that justified the juvenile's confinement. 89 
86. See Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 71 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th 
Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S. 322 (1977) ("[U]nder the parens patriae theory, the juvenile must be 
given treatment lest the involuntary commitment amount to an arbitrary exercise of governmental 
power proscribed by the due process clause.") (emphasis added). 
87. See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 
974 (1984). 
88. Indeed, a recent study by the Federal Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that the pur-
pose argument, as construed by this Note, will support a constitutional right to treatment in a 
significant number of cases. According to the ABA Journal, the study reveals that juveniles are 
often incarcerated for "offenses" that are "as minor as vagrancy and running away from home." 
Jailed Juveniles, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1985, at 32. Only about 10% of jailed juveniles are charged 
with serious crimes, and 25% have committed no crime at all. These results suggest that many 
incarcerated juveniles pose no danger to society, and are confined through an exercise of the 
state's parens patriae power. Under the test proposed by this Note, these juveniles would be 
entitled by the Constitution to some form of rehabilitative treatment. See notes 73-79 supra and 
accompanying text; notes 92-93 infra and accompanying text. 
89. See Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1364-65 (D.R.I. 
1972) ("And whatever deviation, if any, from this goal of rehabilitation which might be tolerated 
as to those incarcerated juveniles convicted of violations of the criminal laws, such deviations are 
far less tolerable for the other classes of children incarcerated by the state.") (emphasis added). 
In Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court did take great pains to 
clarify the distinctions, under New York law, between "PINS" (persons in need of supervision) 
and "IDs" (juvenile delinquents). "IDs," in contrast to "PINS," had committed acts that would 
have been criminal if committed by adults. 349 F. Supp. at 579. Nevertheless, the court's discus-
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This all-or-nothing approach is fraught with peril for those juveniles 
with meritorious constitutional claims. Unwilling to condition the 
state's power to confine dangerous juveniles on the provision of ade-
quate rehabilitative treatment, a court may well reject the claims of 
nondangerous juveniles rather than embrace a broad constitutional 
right to treatment.90 A state may thereby escape its obligation to con-
form the nature of juvenile confinement to its purpose simply because 
it is entitled to incarcerate some juveniles for the protection of society. 
What is necessary in each case is a factual inquiry into the basis of 
the state's jurisdiction over the delinquent juvenile. Where the state, 
by statute, authorizes confinement for the purpose of "care and treat-
ment," it is obvious that the dictates of Jackson v. Indiana 91 are vio-
lated when that treatment is not forthcoming.92 Even when the 
statute enumerates several possible justifications for commitment,93 a 
judicial finding that the confinement is not supported by the need to 
protect society should also be enough to trigger the right to treatment. 
However, when the police power is sufficient in and of itself to support 
the confinement, no constitutional obligation to provide treatment 
should arise. The inquiry must always center on the acts of delin-
quency that have precipitated the incarceration of the juvenile.94 
sion of the right to treatment proceeded in general terms, with no explicit distinctions drawn 
between the two classes of incarcerated juveniles. Indeed, the court noted with seeming approval 
that the right to "effective treatment" had previously been applied to all children, "whether 
delinquent or merely in need of supervision." 349 F. Supp. at 598. 
90. It is conceivable that this fear dissuaded the First Circuit from finding even a limited 
constitutional right to treatment in Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). Santana involved a group of juveniles committed pursuant to the 
"Minor's Law" of Puerto Rico, which authorizes a judge to confine neglected or undisciplined 
children upon a finding that the children's own welfare is threatened. Although juveniles who 
pose a danger to the community are within the statute's sweep, there is no explicit requirement 
that the children pose a threat to anyone other than themselves. 714 F.2d at 1177 n.2, 1180. 
Despite this apparently favorable factual setting, cf notes 27-32 supra and accompanying 
text, the plaintiffs urged a broad constitutional right to treatment upon the court. In denying the 
existence of such a right, the court thought it significant that states may, under appropriate 
circumstances, confine individuals "solely to protect society from them." 714 F.2d at 1176. The 
court's reliance on a hypothetical threat to the community was misplaced, however, in that the 
statute expressly provided for confinement on alternative grounds. Arguably, the court was re-
luctant to posit a broad constitutional right to treatment for fear that Puerto Rico could not meet 
an obligation to provide treatment to those juveniles who did pose a danger to the welfare of the 
community. This suggests that the result may have been somewhat different had individual 
members of the plaintiff class been able to demonstrate that only their own welfare was at stake. 
91. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
92. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(where state statute authorizes commitment for "care and treatment," confinement without 
treatment fails to bear a reasonable relation to the purpose of that confinement). 
93. See Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1177 n.2 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 
974 (1984); note 90 supra. 
94. See notes 20-32 supra and accompanying text. 
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B. The Quid Pro Quo Argument 
The quid pro quo argument derives from the fact that the Supreme 
Court, in recognition of the beneficent purpose of juvenile justice, has 
permitted states to reduce the procedural safeguards available to 
juveniles in civil commitment proceedings.95 The quid pro quo for this 
deprivation, it is argued, is the provision of rehabilitative treatment.96 
In rejecting the quid pro quo argument, the First Circuit in 
Santana v. Collazo97 emphasized the flexibility inherent in the concept 
of due process. 98 As the Supreme Court has indicated on numerous 
occasions, there is no single answer to the question of what process is 
due.99 Rather, "the demands of due process differ according to the 
interests of the individual and of society in the given situation."100 
The Supreme Court, the First Circuit observed, has already examined 
the demands of due process in the juvenile context and held that it is 
constitutionally acceptable for states to provide fewer procedural safe-
guards in that setting.101 Since in reducing the procedural ·safeguards 
available to juveniles the state has committed no constitutional viola-
tion, "there is no legally cognizable quo to trigger a compensatory 
quid."102 
The difficulty with the Santana court's argument is that it ignores 
the critical question of why less process is due in the juvenile context. 
Certainly, the unique problems posed by juvenile delinquency may de-
mand a different approach to due process than is required in adult, 
criminal proceedings. However, essential to the continued constitu-
tionality of procedural distinctions is a determination that the "inter-
ests of the individual and of society"103 do in fact differ in the two 
settings. The First Circuit thought such a determination unnecessary 
since, in its view, the Supreme Court had already balanced the respec-
tive interests of society and juvenile delinquents and concluded that 
reduced procedural safeguards in juvenile proceedings are constitu-
tionally permissible.104 The First Circuit failed to consider, however, 
95. See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text. 
96. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text. 
97. 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). 
98. 714 F.2d at 1177. 
99. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 585 (1975) ("It is too well established to 
require extended discussion that due process is not an inflexible concept."); Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require 
citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands."). 
100. Santana, 714 F.2d at 1177 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)). 
101. 714 F.2d at 1177. The court concluded that "no amount of treatment" would compen-
sate plaintiff's for an unconstitutional deprivation of procedural safeguards. 714 F.2d at 1177. 
102. 714 F.2d at 1177. 
103. See text at note 100 supra. 
104. See text at note 101 supra. 
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that the Supreme Court was prepared to accept reduced procedural 
protection for juveniles precisely and only because it sought to free the 
states to pursue the non punitive, rehabilitative aims of the juvenile sys-
tem.105 When reductions in constitutional protections are justified on 
the assumption that states will pursue particular objectives, it is in-
cumbent upon the courts to inquire whether those objectives are actu-
ally being fulfilled.106 
Should a court determine that the state has failed to utilize its 
greater flexibility in conducting juvenile proceedings to pursue mean-
ingful rehabilitative programs, it must then decide whether to impose 
upon that state an affirmative obligation to provide rehabilitative treat-
ment. According to proponents of the quid pro quo theory, a court is 
empowered to create a new substantive right to treatment in response 
to the denial of procedural safeguards. 107 Indeed, justice would seem 
to require the state to provide treatment when it has been permitted 108 
to reduce procedural safeguards for the purpose of facilitating such 
treatment. For various reasons, however, it may be inappropriate for 
a court to countenance such an exchange of rights. 
One practical objection to providing treatment in lieu of proce-
dural safeguards is that the proposed exchange "makes no sense."109 
If, as a consequence of less rigorous procedures, a juvenile is errone-
ously incarcerated for an act he did not commit, he is obviously not in 
need of rehabilitative treatment. 110 Yet it is treatment that the propo-
nents of the quid pro quo argument offer as "compensation" for the 
relaxation of procedural safeguards. 
This criticism of the quid pro quo theory has substantial force only 
if one accepts the premise that relaxed procedures in the juvenile set-
ting will inevitably result in a substantial increase in erroneous com-
mitments. That premise, however, is probably flawed. The term 
"procedural safeguards" has been employed in a much broader con-
105. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. 
106. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) 
("Where claims that the State is acting in the best interests of an individual are said to justify 
reduced procedural and substantive safeguards, this Court's decisions require that they be 'can-
didly appraised.'") (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967)); cf. note 78 supra. 
107. But see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) 
("A ... troublesome feature of the quid pro quo theory is that it would elevate a concern for 
essentially procedural safeguards into a new substantive constitutional right."). 
108. See note 123 infra and accompanying text. 
109. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1756, 1788 
n.140 (1981). 
110. Professor Garvey writes, in the context of a right to treatment for the mentally ill: 
If the state - because of a relaxed procedure - locks up a sane person, he would hardly 
consider it a fair trade if he were treated for schizophrenia. And, if the state locked up a 
person for five years after proving by the most procedurally scrupulous methods possible 
that he was schizophrenic, he might properly feel cheated that the state refused to provide 
treatment after proving so carefully that he needed it. 
Id. at 1788 n.140. 
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text than the above argument suggests. Many of these so-called "safe-
guards," such as the right to confront witnesses111 and the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 112 are indeed essen-
tial in reducing the risk of error in juvenile proceedings.113 The term 
has also been used, however, to refer to the right to bail, 114 the right to 
be confined apart from adults, 115 and other protections not in any way 
associated with the minimization of erroneous decisions. 116 The 
Supreme Court, recognizing that even civil commitment is a serious 
intrusion on personal liberty, has required the states to provide those 
"procedural safeguards" considered most vital in preventing erroneous 
adjudications.117 It is conceivable, then, that the juvenile is being de-
prived only of those "procedural safeguards" that serve benefits other 
than the prevention of erroneous decisions. To the extent that this is 
true, it is not absurd to compensate for the reduction of "safeguards" 
with rehabilitative treatment. 
There is, however, a more fundamental objection to creating a sub-
stantive right to treatment as the quid pro quo for the deprivation of 
procedural safeguards. The notion of a quid pro quo i~ that one party 
has promised "something" in exchange for "something."118 But the 
111. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42, 56 (1967); Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 971 
(D.P.R. 1982), affd., 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). 
112. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
113. See note 117 infra and accompanying text. 
114. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967); Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 971 (D.P.R. 
1982), affd., 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). 
115. Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 971 (D.P.R. 1982), affd., 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). 
116. See Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 970-71 (D.P.R. 1982), affd., 714 F.2d 1172 
(1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). 
117. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365, 368 (1970) ("The same considerations that de-
mand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent 
child"; therefore, juvenile proceedings that might conceivably result in prolonged confinement 
require that guilt be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 
21, 31-59 (1967) Guvenile offenders must be permitted, inter alia, to confront witnesses, retain 
counsel, and receive notice of the charges against them; "[i]t is these instruments of due process 
which enhance the possibility that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions 
and conflicting data"). 
The most vital procedural safeguard denied to juvenile offenders is the right to trial by jury. 
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). However, there seems to be no basis to 
conclude a priori that a judge will render a greater quantity of erroneous decisions than a lay 
jury. See 403 U.S. at 547 (Blackmun, J., plurality) ("The imposition of the jury trial on the 
juvenile court system would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding function •... "); 403 
U.S. at 551 (White, J., concurring) ("Although the function of the jury is to find facts, that body 
is not necessarily or even probably better at the job than the conscientious judge."). What the 
juvenile loses from the absence of a jury trial may be leniency rather than accuracy. By appeal-
ing to the "community conscience," the juvenile, though guilty of the substantive offense, may 
receive more humanitarian treatment. 403 U.S. at 554-55 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
118. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (5th ed. 1979)(defining "quid pro quo" as "[w]hat 
for what, something for something ... nothing more than the mutual consideration which passes 
between the parties to a contract, and which renders it valid and binding"). 
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Supreme Court has never suggested that the states are obligated to 
provide rehabilitative treatment as the consideration for reduced pro-
cedural safeguards. If there were a constitutional basis for positing a 
substantive right to treatment, it would have been simple for the Court 
to have held that states must provide rehabilitative treatment in lieu of 
procedural safeguards. Instead, the Court merely tried to encourage 
states to provide rehabilitation by freeing them from the strict proce-
dural requirements that are mandated in adult proceedings.119 When 
the states fail to provide rehabilitative treatment - thereby spurning 
the Court's enticement - it does not follow that they suddenly ac-
quire an affirmative obligation to furnish that treatment. The constitu-
tional infirmity in this situation is a procedural one, the state having 
relied on the supposed benevolence of the juvenile justice system to 
deprive juveniles of procedural safeguards. Rather than creating a 
new, substantive constitutional right out of a procedural defect, the 
proper response is for a court to evaluate - in light of the realities of 
the juvenile justice system - whether the "demands of due pro-
cess"12o in fact justify reduced procedural protection.121 Indeed, this 
has been the Supreme Court's typical response to evidence that the 
juvenile justice system has failed in its mission to act in the juvenile's 
welfare.122 
Finally, it is important to recognize that the Supreme Court has 
never mandated that states provide fewer procedural safeguards in ju-
venile proceedings. Rather, it has merely held that certain safeguards 
are not constitutionally required.123 Predictably, then, the quantity 
119. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971): 
The juvenile concept held high promise. We are reluctant to say that, despite disappoint-
ments of grave dimensions, it still does not hold promise, and we are particularly reluctant 
to say .•. that the system cannot accomplish its rehabilitative goals. So much depends on 
the availability of resources, on the interest and commitment of the public, on willingness to 
learn, and on understanding as to cause and effect and cure. In this field, as in so many 
others, one perhaps learns best by doing. We are reluctant to disallow the States to experi-
ment further and to seek in new and different ways the elusive answers to the problems of 
the young, and we feel that we would be impeding that experimentation by imposing the jury 
trial. 
(Emphasis added.) See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(emphasizing the ''worthy goal" as opposed to the requirement, of rehabilitation, and cautioning 
that certain procedural strictures might interfere with the states' ability to achieve that goal) 
(emphasis added). 
120. See text at note 100 supra. 
121. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) 
(courts should evaluate the adequacy of the procedures rather than accept the absence of proce-
dural safeguards and offer in their place what the court considers to be adequate "compensa-
tion"); text at notes 103-06 supra. 
122. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-31 (1967) (In theory, strict procedural safeguards 
were unnecessary in juvenile courts since the state was proceeding, not as adversary, but as 
parens patriae. Since reality departs significantly from theory, the state must provide the juvenile 
with the fundamental due process safeguards.); see also note 138 infra and accompanying text. 
123. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) ("If, in its wisdom, any 
State feels the jury trial is desirable in all cases, or in certain kinds, there appears to be no 
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and character of procedural safeguards afforded in juvenile proceed-
ings will vary from state to state. As with the purpose argument, this 
factual variation makes it exceedingly difficult to posit a constitutional 
right to treatment for all involuntarily confined juveniles.124 
An illustrative case is Santana v. Collazo, 125 in which the district 
court carefully scrutinized the procedural safeguards available to 
juveniles in the commonwealth of Puerto Rico.126 The court discov-
ered that a panoply of procedural safeguards were available to 
juveniles, 127 including several that were not available to adults. 128 In 
view of this favorable dispensation of procedural due process rights, 
the court concluded that "the juvenile justice system of Puerto Rico 
places a juvenile defendant in a privileged position, not in one of con-
stitutional disadvantage."129 
For present purposes, the accuracy of the court's assessment of the 
juvenile system in Puerto Rico is immaterial. The central point is that 
the structure of the juvenile court system is largely a matter of state 
law - subject of course to the minimum requirements imposed by the 
Supreme Court.130 As such, it is impossible to determine a priori 
whether juveniles have been placed at a "constitutional disadvan-
tage"131 in any particular state. Only when a state actually employs 
the rehabilitative objectives of the juvenile system to justify a reduc-
tion in procedural safeguards - and then proceeds to withhold the 
requisite rehabilitation - does it offend constitutional principles. 
Even then, the appropriate remedy would be an insistence on the pro-
cedural safeguards rather than a broad right to treatment.132 
C. The Eighth Amendment 
Finally, some courts have suggested that confinement of juveniles 
impediment to its installing a system embracing that feature. That, however, is the State's privi-
lege and not its obligation."). 
124. See notes 89-94 supra and accompanying text. 
125. 533 F. Supp. 966 (D.P.R. 1982), ajfd., 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 
U.S. 974 (1984). 
126. 533 F. Supp. at 970-71. 
127. These included adequate prior notice of all hearings, the right to counsel - free of 
charge when necessary - and full rights of confrontation, cross-examination and presentation of 
evidence. 533 F. Supp. at 971. The only "substantial right" denied to juveniles was the right to a 
trial by jury, although the court noted that even adults in the co=onwealth of Puerto Rico 
were not "constitutionally entitled to a jury trial in criminal cases." 533 F. Supp. at 971 (citing 
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)) (emphasis in original). 
128. 533 F. Supp. at 970-71. For example, no fingerprints or photographs of the juvenile 
could be taken without judicial authority, and no records of juvenile proceedings could be made 
available to the public. 
129. 533 F. Supp. at 972. 
130. See note 117 supra. 
131. See text at note 129 supra. 
132. See notes 118-22 supra and accompanying text. 
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without treatment may constitute "cruel and unusual" punishment in 
violation of the eighth amendment.133 As a threshold matter, it must 
be determined whether the eighth amendment applies at all to condi-
tions of civil confinement. Although several lower courts have as-
sumed that the eighth amendment applies to the civil confinement of 
juveniles,134 that conclusion is by no means obvious. In Ingraham v. 
Wright, 135 two schoolchildren brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claiming that the infliction of corporal punishment in the public 
schools constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
eighth amendment. This setting provided the Supreme Court with the 
opportunity to canvass the history of the eighth amendment. Noting 
that the "original design of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause was to limit criminal punishments," and distinguishing the 
"openness of the public school and its supervision by the community" 
from the "harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration," the 
Court concluded that the eighth amendment does not apply to corpo-
ral punishment in the public schools.136 
In an important footnote, however, the Court acknowledged that 
the eighth amendment question could not fully be resolved by recourse 
to labels: 
Some punishments, though not labeled "criminal" by the State, may be 
sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments in the circumstances in 
which they are administered to justify application of the Eighth Amend-
ment. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). We have no occasion in this 
case, for example, to consider whether or under what circumstances per-
sons involuntarily confined in mental or juvenile institutions can claim 
the protection of the Eighth Amendment.137 
The above reference to In re Gault assumes special significance in the 
context of juvenile confinement. In Gault, the Supreme Court man-
dated that certain procedural safeguards be afforded in juvenile pro-
ceedings, citing the congruence, in practice, between the rigors of civil 
and criminal confinement.138 Emphasizing the helplessness of the in-
133. See notes 46-51 supra and accompanying text. The eighth amendment applies to the 
states through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101 (1976). 
134. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text. 
135. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
136. See 430 U.S. at 664-671 (emphasis added). 
137. 430 U.S. at 669 n.37 (emphasis added); see also Note, Right to Treatment for the Civilly 
Committed: A New Eighth Amendment Basis, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 731 (1978) (construing this 
footnote to suggest that the eighth amendment might afford a right to treatment to involuntarily 
confined mental patients). 
138. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967): 
Ultimately ..• we confront the reality of that portion of the Juvenile Court process with 
which we deal •... [H]owever euphemistic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial 
school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a 
greater or lesser time. His world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls, regimented 
routine and institutional hours." • . • [H]is world is peopled by guards, custodians, state 
employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape 
and homicide. 
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carcerated juvenile, 139 the Court refused to permit the state to escape 
its constitutional obligations simply by attaching the word "civil" to 
its confinement of juvenile delinquents. Given that both juvenile delin-
quents and criminals are ordinarily incarcerated in harsh institu-
tions, 140 albeit through different procedures, it seems logical to extend 
the eighth amendment's proscriptions to the involuntary confinement 
of juvenile offenders.141 
The more difficult issue is whether the failure to provide rehabilita-
tive treatment is somehow "cruel and unusual." The argument that it 
is cruel and unusual has not been articulated in the federal courts.142 
Since it has never been suggested that the eighth amendment affords a 
right to treatment to those adjudged "criminally responsible,"143 the 
argument must rest on the distinction between those incarcerated for 
criminal behavior and those confined on alternative grounds. In short, 
the argument would be that confinement without treatment of those 
who have not been convicted of crimes offends "evolving standards of 
decency"144 in contravention of the eighth amendment. 
Viewed in this light, it appears that the eighth amendment argu-
ment is nothing but a restatement of the purpose argument.145 Just as 
it is a "fundamental" violation of due process to "deprive any citizen 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
139. See note 138 supra; see also Note, supra note 137, at 741 (The civilly confined person 
shares the harshest element of the prisoner's criminal conviction, involuntary confinement, which 
"renders the prisoner helpless and in need of protection," and places him or her "at the state's 
mercy for the necessities of life and health."). 
140. See note 138 supra. 
141. See Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179-80 (1st Cir. 1983)(use of isolation to disci-
pline juveniles held in detention centers analyzed under eighth amendment standards), cert de-
nied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). But see Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1462-63 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(conditions of involuntary commitment should be judged under due process rather than eighth 
amendment standards). 
142. See notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text. 
143. Cf. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Indefinite confinement 
without treatment of one who has been found not criminally responsible may be so inhumane as 
to be 'cruel and unusual punishment.' "). 
144. Various phrases have been invoked to define the words "cruel and unusual." In Estelle 
v. Gamble, the Court noted that the eighth amendment "embodies 'broad and idealistic concepts 
of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency,' " and concluded that the amendment 
therefore proscribes punishments that are "incompatible with 'the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (citations omitted). 
Further on in the opinion, the Court appeared to backtrack from this broad view of the amend-
ment, employing descriptive phrases such as "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" and 
"repugnant to the conscience of mankind." 429 U.S. at 105-06. In Martorella v. Kelley, where 
the court held that the confinement of "PINS" (persons in need of supervision) without treat-
ment violated the eighth amendment, see notes 21-24 & 48 supra and accompanying text, the 
standard was whether conditions and practices were "so bad" as to be "shocking to the con-
science of reasonably civilized people." 349 F. Supp. 575, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Needless to say, 
this terminology is anything but precise. 
145. See Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (when state acts as 
parens patriae, it assumes an obligation under both the fourteenth and eighth amendments tQ 
furnish adequate treatment). 
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of his or her liberty upon the altruistic notion that the confinement is 
for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate 
treatment,"146 so it is "cruel and unusual" to confine a juvenile for acts 
of delinquency that fall short of criminal behavior and then fail to 
make efforts to return that juvenile to society as a responsible citizen. 
Cast in different terms, and grounded on separate amendments, the 
two arguments appear indistinguishable.147 Essentially, both require 
the state to tailor its confinement of juvenile offenders to the rationale 
for depriving them of their liberty.148 
The eighth amendment argument therefore suffers from the same 
deficiencies as the purpose argument. 149 In certain cases, it will unde-
niably be true that incarceration without treatment violates "evolving 
standards of decency."150 To confine a juvenile in an institution with-
out any sort of guidance because he or she is a habitual truant or run-
away151 would be "shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized 
people."152 The same may not be true, however, of a habitual thief, 
rapist or arsonist. In view of the fact that these juveniles will eventu-
ally be released, it might be wise as a matter of social policy to estab-
lish a rehabilitative program.153 This decision, however, involves the 
delicate balancing of societal resources; it is not a matter of federal 
constitutional law. 
146. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971); see text at note 79 supra. 
147. The arguments may possibly be distinguished on the ground that all juveniles, irrespcc· 
tive of whether they have committed serious crimes, are incapable of forming criminal intent. 
See note 67 supra and accompanying text. This, if true, would implicate the statement in Rouse 
v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966), that confinement without treatment of those not 
"criminally responsible" may be so inhumane as to constitute "cruel and unusual punishment." 
See note 143 supra. 
However, the assumption that all juvenile delinquents are incapable of forming criminal in· 
tent is rather dubious. Depending on the state, juvenile delinquents may be as old as eighteen 
years of age. See R. MENNEL, supra note 20, at xi; text at note 27 supra. At common law, only 
children below the age of seven were deemed to lack the "legal ability" to form criminal intent. 
UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 67, at 15; see also /11 re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 
(1967). And, between the ages of seven and fourteen, there was a rebuttable presumption that 
juveniles were capable of forming the requisite intent. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 67, at 15; cf. /11 re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16 (children over age seven subject to arrest, trial, and 
punishment as adults). Of course, proof in any individual case that the juvenile was not responsi· 
ble for his or her actions would raise serious eighth amendment concerns were that juvenile to be 
punished as a criminal. 
148. See Doe v. McFaul, 599 F. Supp. 1421, 1430 (N.D. Ohio 1984) ("[I]ncarceration of 
juveniles/or rehabilitatio11 violates the Eighth Amendment when the reality of the imprisonment 
is punishment, not treatment.") (emphasis added). 
149. See notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text. 
ISO. See note 144 supra and accompanying text. 
151. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
152. See note 144 supra. 
153. See note 84 supra and accompanying text; see also Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) ("Without a program of individual treatment the 
result may be that the juveniles will not be rehabilitated, but warehoused, and that at the termi-
nation of detention they will likely be incapable of taking their proper places in free society."). 
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CONCLUSION 
Undeniably, there are compelling reasons to insist on rehabilitation 
of juvenile offenders - if not of all persons incarcerated in state pris-
ons and institutions. This Note, however, has addressed itself to the 
narrower question of whether states are constitutionally obligated to 
rehabilitate juvenile delinquents. An analysis of the constitutional the-
ories supporting a right to rehabilitation suggests a unifying theme: 
Before broad constitutional claims to treatment can be evaluated, a 
thorough factual inquiry must be conducted into the circumstances 
surrounding the confinement. 
A court confronted with such claims must inquire into the author-
ity relied upon and the procedures used by the state in depriving the 
juvenile of his or her liberty. If the state must depend on its parens 
patriae power to deprive juveniles of their liberty, the Constitution de-
limits the power of the state to confine the juveniles without treatment. 
Moreover, if the state is unwilling to provide rehabilitative treatment, 
it may not cite the benevolence of the juvenile justice system to justify 
reduced procedural safeguards. However, if the deprivation of liberty 
is justified as a valid exercise of the state's police power, and is accom-
panied by procedures that reflect the realities of the juvenile justice 
system, then the Constitution is silent regarding the allocation of 
scarce societal resources. 
- Andrew D. Roth 
